We consider a game-theoretic model of information retrieval with strategic authors. We examine two different utility schemes: authors who aim at maximizing exposure and authors who want to maximize active selection of their content (i.e. the number of clicks). We introduce the study of author learning dynamics in such contexts. We prove that under the probability ranking principle (PRP), which forms the basis of the current state of the art ranking methods, any better-response learning dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. We also show that other ranking methods induce a strategic environment under which such a convergence may not occur.
Introduction
Information retrieval is probably the most central task carried out by consumers and users of on-line media. The basic information retrieval task involves ranking documents in a corpus by their relevance to the information needs expressed in a query. In adversarial retrieval settings such as the Web, information resources (contents) are owned by strategic bodies -website owners (henceforth authors). Authors can strategically change their content in order to improve their rankings in response to a query in a practice referred to as search engine optimization (SEO) [14] . Therefore, the authors are players in a game, altering their content to increase their utility: increase exposure of their content (in a plain content setting) or to increase selection of their content ("clicks" in a sponsored content setting). In this strategic game, the search engine serves as a mediator between users and authors, and attempts to match queries and websites.
Despite the tremendous amount of work on information retrieval and SEO published during past decades, mathematical modeling of the aforementioned strategic behavior has only been formally suggested and studied recently [3, 5, 22] . One central question in this regard is whether learning dynamics, whereby at every step one author alters her content to increase her utility, is likely to converge. Convergence would suggest that authors should only invest a considerably limited amount of time altering their websites until their utility cannot be further improved. An accompanying question is whether such convergence occurs when state-of-the-art approaches to information retrieval, aiming at ranking documents in the corpus according to estimated relevance probabilities with respect to a given query, are used. The basis for all such retrieval methods is the probability ranking principle (PRP) [23] .
In this paper we introduce what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to explore the learning dynamics of strategic behavior in information retrieval systems such as the Web, through a formal theoretical model. Our main result proves that under the PRP, any better-response learning dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. This result is obtained for the two prevalent utility schemes: authors seeking content exposure (i.e. exposure-targeted), and authors seeking to increase "clicks" in content selection (i.e. action-targeted). Interestingly, this learning dynamics convergence property, which rarely exists in games, is obtained even though our class of games are not potential games [18] . We also show that other plausible ranking methods may not induce such convergence, which further highlights the significance of our results.
Related work
The concept of mediators in strategic environments is widely known to the game-theory community [1, 2, 19] , and the design of a mediator (or in a different terminology, a mechanism) is often called mechanism design [20] . In the context of information retrieval, a search engine can be viewed as a mediator between two parties: users and authors. Considering strategic behavior in an information retrieval context is the aim of [5] . The work of Ben-Basat et al. presents a game-theoretic approach to information retrieval, and illustrates that the myopic static view falls short in dynamic and adversarial settings. Ben-Basat et al. explicitly assume that users will select the highest ranked result, a somewhat strong assumption but nevertheless justified by a large body of empirical work [7, 15, 16] . Note that in this case, PRP coincides with ranking the most relevant document highest. Ben-Basat et al. analyze the user social welfare, defined as the quality of documents available in the presence of strategic behavior of the authors. Interestingly, they demonstrate that introducing randomization into a ranking function can sometimes lead to social welfare that transcends that of applying the PRP. In this paper we also adopt the game-theoretic approach to information retrieval, but explore a different criterion, which is the learning dynamics in games induced by the selection of the PRP as the mediator. Furthermore, beyond the action-targeted utility suggested in [5] , we also analyze exposure-targeted utility.
Learning dynamics is an important concept in machine learning and game theory [9, 10, 12, 21, 25] , and work on learning dynamics in games is considered instrumental, e.g., to understanding ad auctions [8] . Better-response learning dynamics are appealing to the machine learning community, as they only assume a minimal form of rationality: under any given profile, a player will act to increase her individual utility. However, general techniques for showing better-response learning convergence in games are rare, and are based typically on coming up with a potential function [18] , see e.g. [11, 13, 21] . However, as exact potential functions imply the games are congestion games [24] , it is easy to observe that our games do not fit that category. Another interesting class of games which are not potential games for which better-response dynamics always converge is [17] . However, that setting is quite remote from ours, as in [17] , the players share a common set of strategies.
Our contribution
Our main conceptual contribution is the explicit analysis of learning dynamics in information retrieval systems that is motivated by strategic behavior. Our demonstration of convergence serves as an important justification for the use of the PRP, and should be taken into account when designing stable and robust information retrieval systems.
The key technical contribution of this paper is the proof that under PRP any better-response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. We prove this claim for both exposure-targeted and actiontargeted utility schemes. As stated above, the convergence of better-response learning dynamics in our setting is obtained although the class of games we consider do not have an exact potential function. Moreover, we show that other ranking methods induce a strategic environment under which such convergence may not occur. Together, our results provide strong novel machine learning based justification to the PRP and illustrate its applicability in an adversarial context such as the Web.
Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the model we adopt, as well as an informal introduction to the relevant core game-theoretic concepts and an illustrative example. In Section 3 we analyze better-response learning with the PRP mediator for both utility schemes. In Section 4 we show non-learnability of mediators other than the PRP, and Section 5 is devoted to discussion and future work. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs of this paper are deferred to the supplementary material.
Problem statement
The function R is the mediator, which plays the role of a ranking function or a search engine. The mediator ranks the documents selected by the authors w.r.t. a given query (or equivalently, a topic). We assume for simplicity that users always read the document ranked first; thus, we let R(Q, k, a) denote a distribution over the set of documents selected under a w.r.t. a topic k ∈ M , which represents the probability of being displayed in the first position. For ease of notation, we shall also denote R j (Q, k, a) as the probability that author j is ranked first under the distribution R(Q, k, a).
The last component u is the utility function, which maps every strategy profile to a real-valued vector of length n. In this paper, we consider two different utility functions which are motivated by current applications. Under the exposure-targeted utility, denoted by u Ex , an author's utility is the number of impressions her document receives. Formally, the utility of author j under a strategy profile a is given by
Note that u Ex depends solely on the user mass of the topic she writes on and the probability of the mediator displaying her document. The other utility function is the action-targeted utility, denoted by u Ac . Under u Ac , the utility of author j under a strategy profile a is given by
Namely, an author's utility is the user mass of her selected topic times the probability she is ranked first times the quality of her document.
Overall, an authors game can be represented as a tuple G = N, M, D, Q, R, u . It is convenient to quantify the following; B k (a) the highest quality of a document on topic k under the strategy profile a and H k (a) as the number of authors whose documents have the highest quality among those who write on topic k under a. Namely,
Unless stated otherwise, we analyze games with a particular mediator, which is based on the PRP. Since we restrict the ranking list to include one rank only, the PRP coincides with ranking first the highest quality document on that topic. We denote by R P RP the mediator that displays the document with the highest quality. In case there are several documents with the highest quality, R P RP ranks first each one of them with equal probability. Formally, for an author j and a topic k,
otherwise .
Further game theory notation
We now informally introduce some basic game theory concepts used throughout this paper. For an action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a j , , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, we denote by a −j = (a 1 , . . . , a j−1 , a j+1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A −j the action profile of all authors except author j. A strategy a j ∈ A j is called a better response of author j w.r.t. a strategy profile a if u j (a j , a −j ) > u j (a). Similarly, a j ∈ A i is said to be a best response if u j (a j , a −j ) ≥ max aj ∈Aj u j (a j , a −j ) . We say that a strategy profile a is a pure Nash equilibrium (herein denoted PNE) if every author plays a best response under a.
Given a strategy profile a ∈ A, an improvement step is a profile (a j , a −j ) such that a j is a better response of author j w.r.t. a. An improvement path γ = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . ) is a sequence of improvement steps, where the improvements can be performed by different authors. When the path γ is clear from the context, we denote by p r the author that improves in step r. Since the number of strategy profiles is finite, every infinite improvement path must contain an improvement cycle. A non-cooperative game G has the finite improvement property (FIP for brevity) if all the improvement paths are finite; in such a game every better-response dynamics converges to a PNE [18] .
An illustrative example
To further clarify our notation and setting, we provide the following example. Consider a game with n = 2 authors, m = 3 topics, D(1) = 0.5, D(2) = 0.3, D(3) = 0.2, a quality matrix Q = 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.2 , and R P RP as the mediator. Given the utility function, the induced game can be viewed as a normal form bi-matrix game, as presented in Figure 1 .
First, consider the exposure-targeted utility function. Consider the strategy profile (a 1 , a 2 ) = (2, 2) . Under this strategy profile the two authors write on topic 2, and their quality on that topic is the same, i.e., Q 1,2 = Q 2,2 = 0.4; thus, R 1 (Q, 2, (2, 2)) = R 2 (Q, 2, (2, 2)) = 0.5 and u Ex 1 (2, 2) = u Ex 2 (2, 2) = D(2) 2 = 0.15. Notice that author 2 can improve her utility by deviating to topic 1, i.e., to the strategy profile (2, 1). Indeed, this is an improvement step w.r.t. (2, 2) . In this case, her utility is u Ex 2 (2, 1) = 0.5. Clearly (2, 1) is a PNE of this game. The action-targeted utility function induces a different bi-matrix game. The reader can verify that under this utility scheme, the unique PNE is (3, 1).
Better-response learning with the PRP mediator
In this section we show that under the PRP mediator, every better-response dynamics converges to a PNE, for both utility schemes. To make this claim more concrete, we use the following definition. Definition 1. We say that a mediator R is u-learnable if every game induced by R and the utility function u has the FIP property.
Clearly, if any game that consists of (R, u) has the FIP property, then the players can learn a PNE using any better-response dynamics. We use the above definition to crystallize our goals for this section: we wish to show that R P RP is {u Ex , u Ac }-learnable. Namely, in Subsection 3.1 we show that under the PRP mediator and the exposure-targeted utility function, every improvement path is finite. In Subsection 3.2 we prove the equivalent statement for the action-targeted utility function.
Before we go on, we claim that the class of games induced by the PRP mediator does not have an exact potential. Proposition 1. The class of games induced by R P RP and u ∈ {u Ex , u Ac } does not have an exact potential.
Proof sketch of Proposition 1. We show that the necessary condition for the existence of an exact potential [18] does not hold for a general authors game with n ≥ 3 authors. This result is obtained for both utility schemes.
As mentioned in Section 1 above, showing the convergence of any better-response dynamics in the lack of exact potential is challenging, and is nevertheless our goal for the rest of this section. In light of that, we shall introduce a further notation. Given a finite improvement path γ = (a 1 , . . . a l ), we define
i.e., W k (γ) is the minimal number of authors writing documents with the highest quality on topic k. Note that the minimum is taken over all steps in γ.
Exposure-targeted utility
We now focus on games with R P RP and u Ex , namely the PRP mediator and the exposure-targeted utility function. We show that every improvement path is finite, suggesting that any better-response dynamics converges. The proof of this convergence relies on several supporting claims.
The following Proposition 2 claims that in every improvement step, the improving author writes with a quality of at least the highest quality obtained in the preceding improvement step, on that particular topic. Proposition 2. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let a r+1 pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. It holds that Q pr,k ≥ B k (a r ).
We now bound the utility the improving author obtains in the corresponding improvement step, when her document's quality does not exceed the highest quality (on that particular topic) in the preceding improvement step. Proposition 3. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let a r+1 pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. If Q pr,k ≤ B k (a r ), then
Next, we characterize a property that must hold in improvement cycles, under the false assumption that such exist. We prove that if an improvement cycle exists, the quality of the first-ranked document is constant throughout the improvement cycle; this must hold for every topic. Lemma 1. If c = (a 1 , . . . , a l = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and every topic k it holds that B k (a r ) = B k (a r+1 ).
Proof sketch. Under the false assumption that an improvement cycle exists, we prove the claim by induction on the topic index k. This is done by first showing that B 1 (a r ) = B 1 (a r+1 ) holds for topic 1. Afterwards, assuming that B k (a r ) = B k (a r+1 ) holds for every k < k, we show B k (a r ) = B k (a r+1 ) implies that the improving author in improvement step r deviates to a topic with a lower index. Using the bound obtained in Proposition 3, we show that there must be an improving author which does not increase her utility after preforming the deviation, which is clearly a contradiction.
Lemma 1 implies that the only element that varies throughout an improvement cycle, if such exists, is the number of authors who write on each topic. In particular, the highest quality on each topic remains constant. It also suggests that any improving author is not the only author writing the highest quality document on the topic to which she deviated.
Consider an arbitrary improvement step, and denote by k the topic that the improving author writes on in the improvement step. The improving author joins a (non-empty) set of authors which are already writing documents with the highest quality on topic k. Since we deal with a cycle, at some point an author abandons topic k, and deviates to another topic, say k . In Lemma 2 we bound the utility of the improving author (deviating to topic k) with that of the author who deviated to k . Lemma 2. If c = (a 1 , . . . , a l = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and topic k such that a r+1 pr = k there exist (r , k ) such that a r +1
Proof sketch. Let r, k be such that a r+1 pr = k. By definition of improvement step a r pr = k. From Lemma 1 we know that B k (a r ) = B k (a r+1 ); thus, Q pr,k = B k (a r ) and H k (a r ) = H k (a r+1 ). Afterwards, we prove another claim which guarantees that there exists r such that
holds. In addition, p r is the improving author, and so
Clearly, a r +1
Having showed that the condition of Proposition 3 holds, we invoke it for r , k and conclude that
Combining this fact with Equation (1), we get
In Theorem 1 below we leverage Lemma 2 to show that improvement cycles cannot exist.
Proof of Theorem 1. To show that R P RP is u Ex -learnable it suffices to show that every improvement path is finite. Moreover, every improvement path cannot contain more than a finite number of different strategy profiles, as m and n are finite; therefore, if γ is infinite it must contain an improvement cycle.
We are left to prove that γ cannot contain an improvement cycle.
Assume by contradiction that γ contains an improvement cycle c = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l = a 1 ). Let r 1 be an arbitrary improvement step and denote by k 1 the topic such that a r1+1 pr 1 = k 1 . From Lemma 2 we know that there exist (r 2 , k 2 ) such that a r2+1 pr2 = k 2 and
Since a r2+1 pr2 = k 2 , we can now use Lemma 2 again in order to find (r 3 , k 3 ) such that a r3+1 pr3 = k 3 and
This process can be extended to achieve additional k 4 , k 5 , . . . , k m+1 such that
Since there are only m topics and that the inequality above contains m + 1 elements, there are at least two elements which are identical; thus we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that an improvement cycle cannot exist.
Theorem 1 concludes the analysis of the exposure-targeted utility function.
Action-targeted utility
After analyzing games with exposure-targeted utility, we proceed to action-targeted utility. The main result of this subsection is that R P RP is u Ac -learnable, which is analogous to the main result of the previous one. Interestingly, achieving this result requires a more subtle treatment. To motivate it, consider the following: under u Ex , in a case where the quality of an author's document on topic k exceeds the quality of all other authors writing on topic k, she will not deviate to a topic with a higher index (a topic with a lower or equal user mass). This, however, is not true for u Ac . For instance, consider the strategy profile (2, 1) in the example given in Subsection 2.2. Under u Ex , author 1 cannot increase her utility by deviating to topic 3 (a topic with a lower user mass). In contrast, under u Ac , author 1 can improve her utility by deviating to topic 3. To assist in that, let S k (γ) denote the highest quality of a document written on topic k throughout a finite improvement path γ. Formally, given a topic k and an improvement path γ = (a 1 , . . . , a l ),
In Proposition 4 we bound the utility of an improving author in an improvement step. Proposition 4. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let a r+1 pr = k for an arbitrary improvement
Notice that S k (γ) ≤ 1 for every k and every γ; thus, the bound given in Proposition 3 trivially holds for u Ac . However, proving this tighter bound becomes essential for refuting the existence of improvement cycles under u Ac . By proving additional supporting lemmas (which are further elaborated in the appendix), we show that Theorem 2. R P RP is u Ac -learnable.
Non-learnability under other mediators
In the previous section we showed a powerful result: R P RP is {u Ex , u Ac }-learnable. In other words, when using R P RP , any better-response dynamics converges; this is true for both utility schemes. In fact, R P RP is not the only mediator under which such convergence occurs. For instance, Let R RAN D be the random mediator, such that for any author j and any topic k,
By showing that under u Ex any game with R RAN D can be reduced to a game with R P RP , we conclude that
Notice that R RAN D treats every document the same, regardless of its quality. However, in many (and perhaps even most) scenarios mediators seek to promote high-quality content. Therefore, the reader may wonder whether other plausible mediators are {u Ex , u Ac }-learnable. We now focus on a wide and intuitive family of mediators, which we term scoring mediators. Definition 2. Let R be a mediator. We say that R is a scoring mediator if there exists a non-decreasing function f : R → R + such that for every Q, k, a and author index j it holds that
It this case, we denote R = R f for the corresponding f .
Under a scoring mediator every author receives a probability according to the proportion of her score over the sum of the scores of all authors. Notice that if R f is a scoring mediator such that the corresponding f is constant, we get R f = R RAN D . In addition, this family also includes celebrated mediators, e.g. the softmax function (for f (Q j,k ) = e Q j,k ), which is very popular in machine learning applications, or the linear function (for f (Q j,k ) = Q j,k ) that is common in probabilistic models for decision making (for instance, in the Bradley-Terry model [6] ). In the rest of this section, we show non-convergence of better-response dynamics for general families of scoring mediators.
Exposure-targeted utility
In this subsection we prove that, under mild assumptions, scoring mediators are not u Ex -learnable (as opposed to R RAN D ). We restrict ourselves to mediators for which the corresponding function f is continuous, and exhibits the following property: the ratio between the score of the highest quality and the lowest quality is greater than two (note that this property holds trivially if the score of the lowest quality is zero, i.e. f (0) = 0). Among others, this class of mediators contains mediators based on softmax and linear functions, as described above.
Proof sketch: It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem's conditions, we can construct a game instance with an improvement cycle. We exploit the properties of f to construct a game with four authors and three topics, and show that an improvement cycle exists.
While all it takes to prove Theorem 3 is to show a single game instance with an improvement cycle, using our techniques we can actually construct infinitely many games which do not possess FIP. Moreover, our construction can be viewed as a sub-game in a much broader game, i.e. with more authors and topics.
Action-targeted utility
When analyzing scoring mediators, an additional difference between the two utility schemes emerges.
In the improvement cycle constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, there exists an improvement step in which the improving author decreases the quality of her document but still increases her utility. Under the action-targeted utility function, such a decrease may not be translated to improved utility. Namely, the technique employed in Theorem 3 for constructing a game that possesses an improvement cycle might not work here. Nevertheless, the following theorem shows non-learnability under u Ac of scoring mediators that boost high-quality content. For example, a mediator R f where the corresponding f satisfies f (1) > 6f ( 1 2 ) assigns a substantially higher score to the highest quality than a mediocre one. Theorem 4. Let R f be a scoring mediator. If f is a continuous function such that f (1) > 2(2α − 1)f 1 α for some α > 1, then R f is not u Ac -learnable. Notice the resemblance between the condition of Theorem 3 to that of Theorem 4. Due to space limitations, additional result on the non-learnability of scoring mediators under u Ac are further elaborated in the appendix.
Discussion
Our work introduced the study of learning dynamics in the context of information retrieval games. Our results address learning in the framework of the games introduced in [4] (where authors are action-targeted) as well as for a complementary type of information retrieval game in which the authors' aim is to maximize their exposure. Future work may consider mixtures of these models. Our main results show convergence of the learning process for both utility schemes under PRP. These results are also complemented by showing non-learnability under a wide variety of non-PRP mediator. Hence, our results provide strong support for the use of the PRP.
We note that our learning dynamics is based on applying an author's response to the current behavior of other authors. Therefore, the only information available to the author is the quality of the documents currently published. We assume nothing about information available to an author on other authors' (unobserved) qualities. Relaxing the assumption that published documents' qualities can be observed goes beyond the scope of our work, and may be a subject for future research.
An interesting future direction is to expand the information retrieval setting to a setup where each author's document may include several topics. This issue is treated in a preliminary manner in [4] and it may be of interest to see whether our results can be extended to that context as well. It may be also interesting to study the quality of the equilibrium (as far as users' social welfare is concerned) reached under PRP. Would the best equilibrium be obtained under better-response learning dynamics?
A Omitted proofs from section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof makes use of the following theorems by Monderer and Shapley, which are stated slightly different for ease of presentation.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 2.8, [18] ). Let G be a two-by-two bimatrix game such that
Then G is an exact potential game if and only if
Further, Theorem 6 (Corollary 2.9, [18] ). A game G is an exact potential game if and only if every two-by-two subgame of G is an exact potential game.
To show that the class of games induced by the PRP mediator and u Ex (equivalently, u Ac ) does not have an exact potential, it is sufficient to show a subgame of a larger game which is not an exact potential game.
Consider a game G with n = 3 authors, m = 2 topics, D(1) = D(2) = 0.5 and a quality matrix
We first focus on u Ex . Observe that the bimatrix game describing the utilities of authors 1 (rows) and 2 (columns) induced by setting a 3 = 2 is Proof of Proposition 3. Combined with Proposition 2, we know that
Notice that a r pr = k and a r+1 pr = k; hence, together with Equation (3) we obtain
Observe that Equation (4) suggests that
which concludes the proof of this proposition. Proof of Proposition 6. From Property 1 we know that there exists an improvement step r 1 such that H k (a r1 ) = H k (a r1+1 ). Assume WLOG that H k (a r1 ) > H k (a r1+1 ); hence
By the definition of W k (c) we know that there exists an improvement step r 3 such that
From Property 2 we get that for every improvement step r 2 , B k (a r2 ) = B k (a r2+1 ), which implies that |H k (a r2 ) − H k (a r2+1 )| ≤ 1 (7) Combining Equations (5),(6) and (7) with the fact that c is an improvement cycle leads to the fact that there must exist an improvement step r such that a r ∈ {a r1 , a r1+1 , . . . , a r3−1 }, H k (a r ) = W k (c) + 1 and H k (a r+1 ) = W k (c). This implies that a r pr = k and Q pr,k = B k (a r ); therefore,
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume WLOG that c is a simple improvement cycle. First, we prove by induction on the topic index k that B k (a r ) ≤ B k (a r+1 ) holds for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1. Later, we leverage this result to prove the statement of the lemma.
Base: Assume the assertion does not hold for k = 1; hence, there exists r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, such that B 1 (a r ) > B 1 (a r+1 ). As a result, it holds for the improving author p r in step r that Q pr,1 > B 1 (a r −pr ) and H 1 (a r ) = 1. In words, the quality of p r 's document exceeds all other qualities under a r on topic 1; thus,
In addition, a r+1 is an improvement step for author p r , and so u Ex pr (a r ) < u Ex pr (a r+1 ). Combined with Equation (8),
On the other hand, u Ex pr (a r+1 ) ≤ D(a r+1 pr ) holds; thus, Equation (9) implies that D(1) < D(a r+1 pr ), which is clearly a contradiction since D(1) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m).
Step: Suppose the assertion holds for every k where k < K ≤ m, but does not hold for K. Similarly to the base case, there exists r 1 , 1 ≤ r 1 ≤ l − 1, such that B K (a r1 ) > B K (a r1+1 ). As a result, Q pr 1 ,K > B K (a r1 −pr 1 ) and H K (a r1 ) = 1 hold, implying that
In addition, u Ex pr 1 (a r1 ) < u Ex pr 1 (a r1+1 ) holds since p r1 is the improving author; hence, with Equation (10) we get
Let k 1 denote the topic that author p r1 is writing on under a r1+1 , i.e. k 1 = a r1+1 pr 1 . By definition of u Ex we obtain
Recall that D(1) ≥ · · · ≥ D(m); hence, Equations (11) and (12) suggest that D(K) < D(k 1 ) holds, and therefore we are guaranteed that k 1 < K.
Since k 1 < K, the induction hypothesis hints that B k1 (a r1 ) = B k1 (a r1+1 ); therefore, Q pr 1 ,k1 ≤ B k1 (a r1 ) holds and by Proposition 2 we get that Q pr 1 ,k1 = B k1 (a r1 ). Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 3 holds; thus, by invoking it for r 1 , k 1 , we get
Together with Equation (11), we conclude that
Next, we wish to find an improvement step such that the improving author's utility strictly bounds the right-hand-side of Equation (13) . Since a r1+1 pr 1 = k 1 and Q pr 1 ,k1 = B k1 (a r1 ) we get that H k1 (a r1 ) = H k1 (a r1+1 ). In addition, from the induction hypothesis, we get that for every improvement step r , B k1 (a r ) = B k1 (a r +1 ); hence we can invoke Proposition 6 which guarantees the existence of an index r 2 such that a r2 pr 2 = k 1 and D(k 1 ) W k1 (c) + 1 = u Ex pr 2 (a r2 ).
Since p r2 is the improving author u Ex pr 2 (a r2 ) < u Ex pr 2 (a r2+1 ) holds, which together with Equation (14) implies
Let a r2+1 pr 2 = k 2 . By definition of u Ex , we know that u Ex pr 2 (a r2+1 ) ≤ D(k 2 ).
Observe that k 2 < K must hold. To see this, assume otherwise that k 2 ≥ K, and D(k 2 ) ≤ D(K) follows. Incorporating this assumption with Equations (13), (15) and (16) we obtain
, which is a contradiction; hence, k 2 < K. The induction hypothesis hints that B k2 (a r2 ) = B k2 (a r2+1 ), implying Q pr 2 ,k2 ≤ B k2 (a r2 ).
Here again, the condition of Proposition 3 holds; thus, by invoking it for r 2 , k 2 we conclude that
Together with Equation (15), we conclude that
We have therefore bound the right-hand-side of Equation (13) as desired.
This process can be extended to obtain additional k 3 , k 4 , . . . , k K , such that for all
While the inequality above contains K elements, there are only K − 1 topics with index lower than K; hence, at least two of them must be identical, and we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that B K (a r ) ≤ B K (a r+1 ) for every step r. This concludes the proof of the induction. Ultimately, to end the proof of this lemma, fix a topic k.
Due to the induction above,
. The left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the inequality above are identical; thus, they must all hold in equality. This concludes the proof of this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let r, k such that a r+1 pr = k. From Lemma 1 we know that for every improvement step r , B k (a r ) = B k (a r +1 ); thus, Q pr,k ≤ B k (a r ) which by Proposition 2 leads to Q pr,k = B k (a r ).
(17) By definition of improvement step a r pr = k; hence together with Equation (17) we get that H k (a r ) = H k (a r+1 ). Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 6 holds; hence, by invoking it for r, k we conclude the existence of an index r such that a r p r = k and D(k) W k (c) + 1 = u Ex p r (a r ). In addition, p r is the improving author, and so
Having showed the condition of Proposition 3 holds, we invoke it for r , k and conclude that
Combining this fact with Equation (18), we get
C Omitted proofs from subsection 3.2 Proposition 7. Let γ be a finite improvement path, and let a r+1 pr = k for an arbitrary improvement step r. It holds that Q pr,k ≥ B k (a r ).
Proof of Proposition 7. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, since author p r improves her utility, u Ac pr (a r ) < u Ac pr (a r+1 ). By definition of R P RP , if Q pr,k < B k (a r ) then u Ac pr (a r+1 ) = 0 ≤ u Ac pr (a r ), which results in a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Combined with Proposition 7, we know that
Notice that a r pr = k and a r+1 pr = k; hence, together with Equation (19) we obtain
Observe that Equation (20) suggests that
which concludes the proof of this proposition. Proof of Proposition 8. From Property 1 we know that there exists an improvement step r 1 such that H k (a r1 ) = H k (a r1+1 ). Assume WLOG that H k (a r1 ) > H k (a r1+1 ); hence
From Property 2 we get that for every improvement step r 2 , B k (a r2 ) = S k (c), which implies that
Combining Equations (21), (22) and (23) with the fact that c is an improvement cycle leads to the fact that there must exist an improvement step r such that a r ∈ {a r1 , a r1+1 , . . . , a r3−1 }, H k (a r ) = W k (c) + 1, and H k (a r+1 ) = W k (c). This implies that a r pr = k and Q pr,k = B k (a r ) = S k (c); therefore,
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
To ease presentation of the proof, throughout this subsection we re-index the topics according to the following order
. The proof of Theorem 2 relies on several supporting lemmas, which are proven first. Lemma 3. If c = (a 1 , . . . , a l = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and every topic k it holds that B k (a r ) = B k (a r+1 ).
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume WLOG that c is a simple improvement cycle. First, we prove by induction on the topic index k that B k (a r ) ≤ B k (a r+1 ) holds for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1. Later, we leverage this result to prove the statement of the lemma.
Base: By the definition of S 1 (c) we know that there exists an improvement step r , 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1 such that B 1 (a r ) = S 1 (c). Now Assume that the assertion does not hold for k = 1; hence, there exists r , 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, such that B 1 (a r ) > B 1 (a r +1 ). Therefore, combining the above with the fact that c is an improvement cycle implies that there exists an improvement step r such that a r ∈ {a r , a r +1 , . . . , a r } and S 1 (c) = B 1 (a r ) > B 1 (a r+1 ). As a result, it holds for the improving author p r in step r that Q pr,1 = S 1 (c) > B 1 (a r −pr ) and H 1 (a r ) = 1. In words, the quality of p r 's document exceeds all other qualities under a r on topic 1; thus,
In addition, a r+1 is an improvement step for author p r , and so u Ac pr (a r ) < u Ac pr (a r+1 ). Combined with Equation (24),
On the other hand, u Ac pr (a r+1 ) ≤ D(a r+1 pr ) · S a r+1 pr (c) holds; thus, Equation (25) implies that
Step: Suppose the assertion holds for every k where k < K ≤ m, but does not hold for K. Similarly to the base case, by the definition of S K (c), there exists r , 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1 such that B K (a r ) = S K (c). Now since the assertion does not hold for K, there exists r , 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, such that B K (a r ) > B K (a r +1 ). Therefore, combining the above with the fact that c is an improvement cycle implies that there exists r 1 such that a r1 ∈ {a r , a r +1 , . . . , a r } and S K (c) = B K (a r1 ) > B K (a r1+1 ). As a result, it holds for the improving author p r1 in step r 1 that Q pr 1 ,K = S K (c) > B K (a r1 −pr 1 ) and H K (a r1 ) = 1. In words, the quality of p r1 's document exceeds all other qualities under a r1 on topic K; thus,
In addition, u Ac pr 1 (a r1 ) < u Ac pr 1 (a r1+1 ) holds since p r1 is the improving author; hence, with Equation (26) we get
Let k 1 denote the topic that author p r1 is writing on under a r1+1 , i.e k 1 = a r1+1 pr 1 . By definition of u Ac we obtain
Recall that D(1) · S 1 (c) ≥ D(2) · S 2 (c) ≥ . . . ≥ D(m) · S m (c); hence, Equations (27) and (28) suggest that D(K) · S K (c) < D(k 1 ) · S k1 (c) holds, and therefore we are guaranteed that k 1 < K.
Since k 1 < K, the induction hypothesis hints that B k1 (a r1 ) = B k1 (a r1+1 ); therefore, Q pr 1 ,k1 ≤ B k1 (a r1 ) holds and by Proposition 7 we get that Q pr 1 ,k1 = B k1 (a r1 ).Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 4 holds; thus, by invoking it for r 1 , k 1 , we get
Together with Equation (27), we conclude that
Next, we wish to find an improvement step such that the improving author's utility strictly bounds the right-hand-side of Equation (29). Since a r1+1 pr 1 = k 1 and Q pr 1 ,k1 = B k1 (a r1 ) we get that H k1 (a r1 ) = H k1 (a r1+1 ). In addition from the induction hypothesis, we get that for every improvement step r , B k1 (a r ) = S k1 (c); hence, we can invoke Proposition 8 which guarantees the existence of an index r 2 such that a r2 pr 2 = k 1 and
Since p r2 is the improving author u Ac pr 2 (a r2 ) < u Ac pr 2 (a r2+1 ) holds, which together with Equation (30) implies
Let a r2+1 pr 2 = k 2 . By definition of u Ac , we know that
Observe that k 2 < K must hold. To see this, assume otherwise that k 2 ≥ K, and D(k 2 ) · S k2 (c) ≤ D(K) · S K (c) follows. Incorporating this assumption with Equations (29),(31) and (32) we obtain
which is a contradiction; hence, k 2 < K. The induction hypothesis hints that B k2 (a r2 ) = B k2 (a r2+1 ), implying Q pr 2 ,k2 ≤ B k2 (a r2 ).
Here again, the condition of Proposition 4 holds; thus, by invoking it for r 2 , k 2 we conclude that
Together with Equation (31), we conclude that
We have therefore bound the right-hand-side of Equation (29) as desired.
This process can be extended to obtain additional k 3 , k 4 , . . . , k K , such that for all i ∈ [K], k i < K and
Due to the induction above, B k (a r ) ≤ B k (a r+1 ) holds for every 1 ≤ r ≤ l − 1, i.e.
In addition, Lemma 4. If c = (a 1 , . . . , a l = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle, then for every improvement step r and topic k such that a r+1 pr = k there exist (r , k ) such that a r +1 p r = k and
Proof of Lemma 4. Let r, k such that a r+1 pr = k. From Lemma 3 we know that for every improvement step r , B k (a r ) = S k (c); thus, Q pr,k ≤ B k (a r ) which by Proposition 7 leads to Q pr,k = B k (a r ) = S k (c).
(33) By definition of improvement step a r pr = k; hence together with Equation (33) we get that H k (a r ) = H k (a r+1 ). Notice that c is a finite improvement path, and that the condition of Proposition 8 holds; hence, by invoking it for r, k we conclude the existence of an index r such that a r p r = k and D(k) · S k (c) W k (c) + 1 = u Ac p r (a r ). In addition, p r is the improving author, and so
Having showed the condition of Proposition 4 holds, we invoke it for r , k and conclude that
Combining this fact with Equation (34), we get
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Similarly to Theorem 1, to show that every better-response dynamics converges it suffices to show that every improvement path is finite. Moreover, every improvement path cannot contain more than a finite number of different strategy profiles, as m, n are finite; therefore, if γ is infinite it must contain an improvement cycle. We are left to prove that γ cannot contain an improvement cycle.
Assume by contradiction that γ contains an improvement cycle c = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l = a 1 ). Let r 1 be an arbitrary improvement step and denote by k 1 the topic such that a r1+1 pr 1 = k 1 . From Lemma 4 we know that there exist (r 2 , k 2 ) such that a r2+1 pr2 = k 2 and
Since a r2+1 pr2 = k 2 , we can now use Lemma 4 again in order to find (r 3 , k 3 ) such that a r3+1 pr3 = k 3 and
Since there are only m topics and that the inequality above contains m + 1 elements, there are at least two elements which are identical; thus we obtain a contradiction. We deduce that an improvement cycle can not exist.
The above suggests that every better-response dynamics must converge.
D Omitted proofs from section 4
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove that R RAN D is u Ex -learnable, one must show that every game induced by R RAN D and the utility function u Ex has the FIP property.
Let G = N, M, D, Q, R RAN D , u Ex be an arbitrary game. We now reduce G to a game G with R P RP as a mediator, where the utility of any author under any strategy profile in G equals to her utility under the same strategy profile in G . If this holds, then every improvement step in G is also an improvement step in G ; hence, if there are no improvement cycles in G , then there can be no improvement cycles under G either. Let G = N, M, D, Q , R P RP , u Ex for Q such that ∀j ∈ N, k ∈ M : Q j,k = 1.
Since both G, G consists of the exposure-targeted utility function, we omit the super-script Ex and use the super-script G to specify the utility of author j under the strategy profile a in G, i.e. u G j (a), and equivalently for u G j (a) for G . By definition of exposure-targeted utility and R P RP , for every valid j and a it holds that
= u G j (a). Since G possesses R P RP as a mediator, Theorem 1 guarantees that G has the FIP property. Since we showed G and G are strategically equivalent, G also has the FIP property, and in particular contains no improvement cycles.
Proof of Theorem 3. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem's conditions, we can find a game instance with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let R f be a scoring mediator with the corresponding function f , which we assume exhibits f (1) > 2f (0). Due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist
For brevity, denote
, and observe that c 2 > 2c 1 . Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors, |M | = 3 topics and a quality matrix Q such that   
The only missing ingredient is the distribution D over the topics. The selection of such D is crucial: we shall select D to allow improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim. Claim 1. There exists such that 0 < ≤ 1 4 and the following properties hold
The proof of Claim 1 appears after this proof. Now, let be an arbitrary constant satisfying the properties of Claim 1, and define D such that
.
It can be verified that D is a valid distribution over the set of topics.
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles a 1 = (1, 1, 1, 2) , a 2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a 3 = (1, 2, 3, 2), 2, 3, 3 ), a 5 = (1, 1, 3, 3 ), a 6 = (1, 1, 1, 3) . In the rest of this proof we show that the cycle c = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle. More precisely, we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, u Ex pr (a r ) < u Ex pr (a r+1 ).
• u Ex p1 (a 1 ) < u Ex p1 (a 2 ): the deviating author is
thus, a 2 is an improvement step.
; thus, a 3 is an improvement step. 
; thus, a 4 is an improvement step.
• u Ex p4 (a 4 ) < u Ex p4 (a 5 ): the deviating author is p 4 = 2.
Observe that R f 2 (Q, 2, a 4 ) = 1 and R f 2 (Q, 1, a 5 ) = 1 2 . It holds that
; thus, a 5 is an improvement step.
• u Ex p5 (a 5 ) < u Ex p5 (a 6 ): the deviating author is p 5 = 3. Observe that R f 3 (Q, 3, a 5 ) = 1 1+c2 and R f 3 (Q, 1, a 6 ) = 1 1+2c1 . It holds that
thus, a 6 is an improvement step.
• u Ex p6 (a 6 ) < u Ex p6 (a 1 ): the deviating author is p 6 = 4. Observe that R f 4 (Q, 3, a 6 ) = 1 and R f 4 (Q, 2, a 1 ) = 1. It holds that
; thus, a 1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 = a 1 ) in an improvement cycle. As a result, R f is not u Ex -learnable.
Proof of Claim 1. Since c 2 > 2c 1 , it follows that
Since the left-hand-side is strictly less than 1 2 , we denote by 1 a positive real number such that
In addition, notice that c 1 > 1; thus, 1 1+c1 < 1 2 . We denote by 2 a positive real number such that
Similarly, since c 2 is constant and c 2 > 2, there exists 3 > 0 such that c 2 · 3 < 1 5 , which implies that Proof of Theorem 4. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem's conditions, we can find a game instance with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let R f be a scoring mediator with the corresponding function f , which we assume exhibits f (1) > 2(2α − 1)f 1 α for some α > 1. Due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist
The only missing ingredient is the distribution D over the topics. The selection of such D is crucial: we shall select D to allow improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2.
There exists such that 0 < ≤ 1 6 and the following properties hold
The proof of Claim 2 appears after this proof. Now, let be an arbitrary constant satisfying the properties of Claim 2, and define D such that
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles (1, 1, 1, 2) , a 2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a 3 = (1, 2, 3, 2), 1, 3, 3 ), a 6 = (1, 1, 1, 3) .
In the rest of this proof we show that the cycle c = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 = a 1 ) is an improvement cycle. More precisely, we prove that for every r, 1 ≤ r ≤ 6, u Ac pr (a r ) < u Ac pr (a r+1 ).
• u Ac p1 (a 1 ) < u Ac p1 (a 2 ): the deviating author is
= R f 2 (Q, 2, a 2 ) · D(2) · Q 2,2 = u Ac 2 (a 2 ); thus, a 2 is an improvement step.
• u Ac p2 (a 2 ) < u Ac p2 (a 3 ): the deviating author is p 2 = 3. Observe that R f 3 (Q, 1, a 2 ) = 1 1+c1 and R f 3 (Q, 3, a 3 ) = 1. It holds that 
thus, a 5 is an improvement step.
• u Ac p5 (a 5 ) < u Ac p5 (a 6 ): the deviating author is p 5 = 3. Observe that R f 3 (Q, 3, a 5 ) = 1 2 and R f 3 (Q, 1, a 6 ) = 1 1+2c1 . It holds that
• u Ac p6 (a 6 ) < u Ac p6 (a 1 ): the deviating author is p 6 = 4.
Observe that R f 4 (Q, 3, a 6 ) = 1 and R f 4 (Q, 2, a 1 ) = 1.Since 1 α < x 3 < x 2 < 1 we get that
implying that x 2 < αx 3 ; thus, it holds that
= R f 4 (Q, 2, a 1 ) · D(2) · Q 4,2 = u Ac 4 (a 1 ); thus, a 1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 = a 1 ) in an improvement cycle. As a result, R f is not u Ac -learnable.
Proof of Claim 2. Since c 2 > 2c 1 , it follows that
In addition, notice that c 1 > 2α − 1; thus, 1 1+c1 < 1 2α . We denote by 2 a positive real number such that
Since α > 1 and c 2 > 4α − 2, for every 0 < 3 < 1 6 it holds that
The proof is completed by setting = min{ 1 , 2 , 3 }.
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E Non-learnability under action-targeted utility
In this section we prove non-learnability of another family of scoring mediators under u Ac . We consider scoring mediators where the corresponding function f is bounded by (non-affine) linear functions. Examples for such functions are f (x) = x and f (x) = e x − 1.
Theorem 7. Let R f be a scoring mediator. If f is continuous function and there exist α, β > 0 such
Proof of Theorem 7. It is sufficient to show that for every f that satisfies the theorem's conditions, we can find a game instance with an improvement cycle. While all it takes to prove the theorem is to construct a single counter example (and this is what we do), using the technique below we can actually construct an infinite number of games which do not possess FIP.
Let R f be a scoring mediator with the corresponding continuous function f , and let α and β such that α, β > 0 and ∀x
For brevity, denote z = β α . Since α · 0 ≤ f (0) ≤ β · 0 we know that f (0) = 0. Notice that for every, x ∈ (0, 1], it must hold that f (x) > 0 as αx ≤ f (x) where α > 0. Let x 1 be an arbitrary quality such that x 1 ∈ (0, 1]. Due to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exist x 2 , x 3 such that 0 < x 3 < x 2 < x 1 ≤ 1 and 5zf (x 2 ) = f (x 1 ), 11zf (x 3 ) = f (x 1 ).
Consider a game with |N | = 4 authors, |M | = 3 topics and a quality matrix Q such that   
The only missing ingredient is the distribution D over the topics. The selection of such D is crucial: we shall select D to allow improvement cycles. In service of that, we prove the following claim. It can be verified that D is a valid distribution over the set of topics.
We claim that the game we constructed above possesses an improvement cycle. Consider the strategy profiles a 1 = (1, 1, 1, 2), a 2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), a 3 = (1, 2, 3, 2), a 4 = (1, 2, 3, 3), a 5 = (1, 1, 3, 3 ), a 6 = (1, 1, 1, 3) .
• u Ac p1 (a 1 ) < u Ac p1 (a 2 ): the deviating author is p 1 = 2. Observe that R f 2 (Q, 1, a 1 ) = 5zf (x2) (10z+1)f (x2) = 5z 10z+1 and R f 2 (Q, 2, a 2 ) = 11zf (x3) (11z+1)f (x3) = 11z 11z+1 . It holds that u Ac 2 (a 1 ) = R f 2 (Q, 1, a 1 ) · D(1) · Q − · x 1 = R f 2 (Q, 2, a 2 ) · D(2) · Q 2,2 = u Ac 2 (a 2 ); thus, a 2 is an improvement step.
• u Ac p2 (a 2 ) < u Ac p2 (a 3 ): the deviating author is p 2 = 3. Observe that R f 3 (Q, 1, a 2 ) = 1 5z+1 and R f 3 (Q, 3, a 3 ) = 1. It holds that u Ac 3 (a 2 ) = R f 3 (Q, 1, a 2 ) · D(1) · Q 3,1 = = R f 2 (Q, 1, a 5 ) · D(1) · Q 1,2 = u Ac 2 (a 5 ); thus, a 5 is an improvement step.
• u Ac p5 (a 5 ) < u Ac p5 (a 6 ): the deviating author is p 5 = 3. Observe that R f 3 (Q, 3, a 5 ) = = R f 3 (Q, 1, a 6 ) · D(1) · Q 3,1 = u Ac 3 (a 6 ); thus, a 6 is an improvement step.
• u Ac p6 (a 6 ) < u Ac p6 (a 1 ): the deviating author is p 6 = 4. Observe that R f 4 (Q, 3, a 6 ) = 1 and R f 4 (Q, 2, a 1 ) = 1.Since for every x, αx ≤ f (x) ≤ βx we get that
implying that f (x 2 ) < 11z 5 · x 3 ; thus, it holds that u Ac 4 (a 6 ) = R f 4 (Q, 3, a 6 ) · D(3) · Q = R f 4 (Q, 2, a 1 ) · D(2) · Q 4,2 = u Ac 4 (a 1 ); thus, a 1 is an improvement step.
The above analysis implies that c = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , a 7 = a 1 ) in an improvement cycle. As a result, R f is not u Ac -learnable. The proof is completed by setting = min{ 1 , 2 , 3 }.
